Who is Gautama Buddha

Thursday, 22 October 2026

Saudi Arabia economic growth visualization dashboard

Saudi Arabia: Annual Growth Indicator, 1987–2024

Source: SA.xlsx (Country: Saudi Arabia, SAU). Values are annual percent change; the indicator name is not given in the file.

Shocks and Recovery

The biggest drops and jumps, and what followed.

Largest declines

YearValue
2020-23.90%
2009-11.68%
2010-2.73%
2012-1.04%
2002-0.94%

Largest gains

YearValue
198818.65%
198716.08%
202114.73%
198912.13%
202210.64%

Key readings

  • The 2009 fall (-11.7%) and the 2020 fall (-23.9%) are the two deepest. The 2020 drop was about twice as deep as 2009.
  • Rebound: 2021 posted 14.7%, the third highest year on record, followed by 10.6%, 7.7% and 6.8% in 2022 to 2024.
  • Stability: from 2014 to 2019 values stayed between 1.2% and 3.6%, the calmest run in the series.
  • 6 negative years in total: 2002, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2020.





Report on Historical Growth Patterns, Threshold Performance, and the Way Forward
1. Executive summary
The dashboard summarizes 38 years of an unspecified growth measure. Its clearest finding is that positive growth was much more common than negative growth: 32 of the 38 years—approximately 84%—cleared the dashboard’s 0% threshold, while six years recorded negative growth. The largest individual growth band was “7% and above,” containing 12 years.�
This points to a historical record with frequent growth and a meaningful number of strong-growth years. However, the dashboard shows the distribution of outcomes, not their chronological order. It therefore cannot establish whether growth has recently accelerated, whether downturns clustered into particular periods, or whether the underlying measure became more stable over time.
The most useful next step is to connect these summary charts to the underlying year-by-year data. That would turn a description of historical frequency into an assessment of trends, risks, and future priorities.
2. Scope and interpretation
The screenshot contains two complementary views:
A doughnut chart showing the share of years in four growth bands.
A funnel showing how many years cleared progressively higher growth thresholds.�
The screenshot does not identify the underlying variable, geography, sector, data source, or period covered. Consequently, this report refers to “growth” without assuming that it means GDP, company revenue, investment returns, production, or another measure.
This distinction matters: the charts support conclusions about the frequency of different outcomes, but not explanations of what caused them.
3. Distribution of growth outcomes
The growth-band chart divides the 38 years as follows. Percentages below are calculated from the displayed counts.�
Growth was common, but its strength varied
The two middle bands together account for 20 years, or 52.6% of the sample. Thus, although the highest band is the largest single category, more than half of all observations fall in the combined 0%–7% range.�
This is an important distinction. The record contains substantial strong growth, but it is not dominated by years of 7% or more. That highest band represents just under one-third of the sample—not a majority.
Negative years were a minority
Six negative-growth years represent approximately one in every six observations. The other 32 years fall in the chart’s nonnegative growth bands.�
The frequency of negative years alone does not reveal their severity. A small contraction and a very large contraction count equally in this chart, despite potentially having very different consequences.
The most common band is not the average growth rate
The “7% and above” category is the modal band: it contains more years than any other individual category. That does not establish that average growth was above 7%. Exact annual values are required to calculate the mean, median, range, and volatility.
4. What the growth funnel reveals
The funnel asks a different question: how often did growth exceed a given benchmark? Its categories are cumulative, so a year above 5% is also included among years above 3% and above 0%. They should not be added together.�
The lowest visible funnel segment appears to show five years above 10%, equivalent to approximately 13.2% of the sample. Because this label is small in the screenshot, that reading should be checked against the original dashboard before formal publication.�
Higher growth was progressively less frequent
The funnel narrows from 32 years above 0%, to 22 above 3%, and then to 15 above 5%. This separates three aspects of performance:
Frequency of growth: growth above zero occurred in a large majority of years.
Frequency of stronger growth: more than half of the sample exceeded 3%.
Frequency of high growth: fewer than half exceeded 5%.�
The implication is that “growth occurred” and “growth was strong” are materially different descriptions of this record.
Threshold definitions need clarification
The doughnut uses labels such as “0 to 3%” and “3 to 7%,” while the funnel uses “Above 0%” and “Above 3%.” The screenshot does not state how observations exactly equal to 0%, 3%, or 7% are assigned.�
The published methodology should specify whether each boundary is inclusive or exclusive. This is particularly important when reconciling the band counts with the threshold counts.
5. What the charts tell us about history—and what they do not
The dashboard provides a historical frequency profile rather than a historical timeline.
It establishes that the 38-year sample included negative, lower-growth, middle-range, and high-growth outcomes. It does not identify when those outcomes occurred or how long particular conditions lasted.�
Several very different histories could produce the same charts:
Negative years might be concentrated in an early period, followed by sustained improvement.
They might be spread across the full period.
Strong years might occur in long runs or as isolated rebounds.
These are illustrative possibilities, not findings from the screenshot.
Accordingly, the available evidence cannot establish:
A long-term upward or downward trend.
The timing or duration of downturns.
Whether high growth was sustained.
The speed of recovery after negative years.
Whether recent performance differs from the earlier record.
The causes of any changes.
A historical narrative naming particular crises, reforms, policies, or market developments would require the actual dates and the identity of the growth series.
6. Way forward
The following is a proposed analytical work programme, not a forecast derived from the chart.
First: establish the data foundation
Document:
What is growing and how growth is calculated.
The first and last years covered.
The original source and any revisions.
Whether the series is nominal or inflation-adjusted, where relevant.
The treatment of missing observations and threshold boundaries.
Second: restore the time dimension
Add a year-by-year line chart with a zero-growth reference line. Use it to identify the timing of contractions, periods of sustained growth, and changes between earlier and later years.
Compare subperiods rather than relying only on the full-sample distribution. The central question is whether the historical pattern has changed.
Third: measure magnitude as well as frequency
Calculate average and median growth, volatility, the largest contraction, the strongest expansion, and the longest runs of positive and negative growth.
If the underlying measure supports compounding, also calculate cumulative growth and the compounded annual growth rate. Counts alone cannot show how much the underlying level increased over the full period.
Fourth: investigate persistence and recovery
Examine what typically followed a negative-growth year and whether high-growth years tended to persist. This would help distinguish sustained improvement from temporary rebounds.
Fifth: connect strategy to the identified series
Once the subject is known, the practical priorities should be framed around three questions:
How can the frequency and severity of negative outcomes be reduced?
What distinguishes lower-growth years from stronger-growth years?
Which conditions support sustained strong growth rather than isolated peaks?
The dashboard provides a useful starting point: it shows how often different outcomes occurred. A credible forward-looking strategy requires the missing chronology, magnitudes, and context—not simply an extension of the historical percentages.



Thursday, 8 October 2026

Asian economic growth analysis

 







Economic growth, 2015-2024 (GDP per person change, highest to lowest):

Bangladesh: +76%. GDP per person rose from $1,360 to $2,397. Manufacturing share of GDP rose from about 17% to 21%. Its working-age share grew (+2.8 pts), the most in the group, but it ran a trade deficit (-$4.4B).

Vietnam: +72%. Manufacturing output grew 3.4 times, from $32.7B to $111B, and its factory share of GDP jumped from about 14% to 25%. It ran a surplus ($20.5B), though its working-age share fell (-1.8 pts).

India: +62%. It has the widest deficit in the group (-$49.0B). Its factory share is low, about 13% and slightly lower than in 2015. Its working-age share grew (+2.0 pts).

China: +58%. It has the biggest surplus ($248B) and made 64% of the group's manufacturing output ($4.69T). Its factory share is high (about 26%) but slightly lower than in 2015. Its working-age share fell (-2.7 pts).

Singapore: +45%. It is the richest economy in the group, with a surplus of $79.0B. Its working-age share fell the most (-3.1 pts, from 73.8% to 70.7%).

Indonesia: +45%. Its factory share fell from about 21% to 18%, and it ran a small deficit (-$4.0B). Its working-age share grew modestly (+1.1 pts).

Philippines: +36%. Its factory share fell from about 20% to 17.5%, and it ran a deficit (-$8.9B). Its working-age share grew (+2.2 pts).

Malaysia: +28%. Its factory share edged up to about 23.5%, and it ran a surplus ($10.7B). Its working-age share grew the least among the gainers (+0.7 pts).

Thailand: +22%. It has the highest factory share (about 26.5%), though slightly lower than in 2015, and a surplus of $14.5B. Its working-age share fell (-2.9 pts), the second-largest drop.

South Korea: +20%. It is a rich, factory-heavy economy (about 26% of GDP) with a $42.0B surplus. Its working-age share fell (-2.5 pts).

Pakistan: +14%. It has the lowest income and lowest factory share (about 12%), and ran a deficit (-$11.7B). Its working-age share grew (+2.7 pts).

Japan: -3%. It is the only economy whose income fell. It has a large surplus ($148B), but its working-age share fell (-2.2 pts).

Overall pattern: The poorer, younger economies (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan) grew fast in percentage terms while gaining working-age population. The richer, older economies (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, China) grew slower, with big surpluses and shrinking working-age shares. Vietnam is the standout, combining fast growth, a factory surge and a surplus.

Singapore and Indonesia are tied at +45%. The factory-share figures are my estimates from the bubble chart, so treat them as approximate.

Tuesday, 6 October 2026

Indian economy a study


  • Specialization Project

  • BY:- SIDDHARTH JAISWAL

  • MSCE_A

  • ID-21122316

  • (CHRIST UNIVERSITY LAVASA)






  • PREFACE 

  • Its  A Review’, which consists of  Indian growth based on Economics and Visualization methods using tools to study.This is not the Economic Survey of India  but an Analysisusing Economics stream and Analytics for college Education.

  • This review takes stock of the state of the Indian economy and its journey in the last ten years and offers a brief sketch of the outlook for the economy in the coming years government’s policies and progress on various parameters in different sectors. It now appears very likely that the Indian economy will achieve a growth rate at or above 7% for FY24, and some predict it will achieve another year of 7% real growth in FY25 as well. If the prognosis for FY25 turns out to be right, that will mark the fourth year post-pandemic that the Indian economy will have grown at or over 7 per cent. That would be an impressive achievement, testifying to the resilience and potential of the Indian economy. It augurs well for the future. Some economists1 argue, with considerable merit, that not all growth is equal. They are right. It is one thing for India to grow at 8-9 per cent when the world economy is growing at 4 per cent, but it is another thing to grow at or above 7 per cent when the world economy is struggling to grow at 2 per cent. One unit of growth in the latter circumstance is qualitatively superior to the former. The marginal utility of growth in the second scenario is much higher. The global economy is struggling to maintain its recovery post-Covid because successive shocks have buffeted it. Some of them, such as supply chain disruptions, have returned in 2024. If they persist, they will impact trade flows, transportation costs, economic output and inflation worldwide. India will not be exempt from it, but having faced and seen off COVID and the energy and commodity price shocks of 2022, India is quietly confident of weathering the emerging disturbances. At least three trends will be with us in the coming years. The era of hyper-globalisation in global manufacturing is over. It does not mean that de-globalisation will be upon us any time soon, as countries are only now discovering the enormous integration of global supply chains that have taken place in the last few decades. So, an alternative to the globalisation of supply chains will take much longer to emerge if it ever does. However, that will not deter governments from pursuing onshoring and friend-shoring of production with a consequent impact on transportation, logistics costs, and, hence, the 


  • Review:-

  • final prices of products. Recent events in the Red Sea may have brought back concerns over reliance on global supply chains, further

  • The Indian Economy: A Review  to identify the slower growth in global trade in 2023. In other words, traditional economics leading to one’s way to growth will not be easy. This reinforces the need to lower logistics costs and invest in product quality to hold on to and expand market share in areas where India has an advantage. Closely related to this challenge is the advent of Artificial Intelligence with the profound and troubling questions it poses for growth in services trade and employment since technology might remove the advantage of cost competitiveness that countries exporting digital services enjoy. Third and arguably the most important is the energy transition challenge. Concerns over rising temperatures have led to a single-minded focus on reducing carbon emissions amidst the determination that the emission of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon, is the most significant causal factor. This has led to persistent demands from international organisations and advanced nations on developing nations to wean themselves off fossil fuels and switch to greener energy even as technological and resource obstacles remain and are not on offer from developed countries. It is a reality that, in the short run, there is a trade-off between economic growth and energy transition. In a growth-challenged post-Covid global economy, countries can ill afford to sacrifice the former for the latter. India is walking the fine line between the two more skilfully than other nations, with installed non-fossil fuel-based power generation capacity running ahead of targets. Importantly, India’s unwavering commitment to ensuring steady economic growth is generating resources for investment needed for climate change adaptation, building resilience, and mitigating emissions. The Indian economy is better placed than ever to take on these three key challenges because of the policies adopted and implemented in the last decade. The Union government has built infrastructure at a historically unprecedented rate, and it has taken the overall public sector capital investment from ₹5.6 lakh crore in FY15 to ₹18.6 lakh crore in FY24, as per budget estimates. That is a rise of 3.3X. Whether the total length of highways, freight corridors, number of airports, metro rail networks or the trans-sea link, the ramp-up of physical and digital infrastructure in the last ten years is real, tangible and transformative. The financial sector is healthy. Its balance sheet is stronger. It is willing to lend and is lending. Non-food credit growth, excluding personal loans, is growing at double-digit rates. The pursuit of inclusive development finds Indian households in good financial health. Fiftyone crore bank accounts under Jan Dhan Yojana now have total deposits of over ₹2.1 lakh crore. Over 55 per cent of them are women. In Dec. 2019, household financial assets were 86.2 per cent of GDP; liabilities were 33.4 per cent of GDP. In March 2023, these numbers were 103.1 per cent and 37.6 per cent, respectively. So, Net Financial Assets of households were 52.8 per cent of GDP in Dec. 2019, and by March 2023, it had improved to 65.5 per cent of GDP.


  • INDIAN ECONOMY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 

  • In 10 years, India has moved from the 10th largest economy of the world to the 5th largest economy of the world. In 10 years, India is now seen as a country with immense potential which is backed by impressive performance.” -Shri. Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India 1.1 Over the course of the last decade, India has showcased a robust and resilient growth story driven by perseverance, ingenuity, and vision. In the face of unprecedented challenges such as the Covid pandemic and geopolitical conflicts, the Indian economy has demonstrated a remarkable ability to bounce back and convert challenges into opportunities while striving to achieve strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth. The present chapter takes a look at the Indian growth experience since independence, the state of the economy as of 2014, when the government under Prime Minister Modi assumed power, the key drivers of growth of the present decade, and the outlook till 2030. The Indian Growth Story (1950 to 2014) 1.2 By the time India became independent, her share of world income had shrunk from 22.6 per cent in 1700 to 3.8 per cent in 19523 . To enable the economy to emerge from the shackles of the colonial regime as well as set itself on the path of growth and modernisation, the government in the 1950s adopted a strategy aimed at achieving economic sufficiency. This period was characterised by rapid industrialisation, which involved raising a massive amount of resources and investing them in the creation of large industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The decadal average growth rate for this period (1952-60) was 3.9 per cent. However, the 1960s witnessed the Indian economy going through several doldrums. The 1962 SinoIndian war and the 1965-66 India-Pakistan war, combined with severe drought in 1965, had significant repercussions on the Indian economy. High rates of taxation and pervasive control of the economy also played a key role in the growth trajectory of the economy slowing down during this period and posting a decadal growth rate of 4.1 per cent in the 1960s.








Growth Exoerience:-

Lessons from the growth experience till 2014 1.7 The growth experience that has been elaborated on in the previous section provides some interesting insights into the key features whose accumulated impact characterised the Indian economy as was inherited by Prime Minister Modi’s government in 2014. 1.8 First, the Indian economy transitioned from a closed economy to an open economy6 . The period from 1950-1980 was characterised by import substitution, export subsidies, and stringent restraints on technology and investment cooperation. Substantial controls on capacity expansion and licensing requirements for manufacturing industries were also imposed during this period. The post-1980 period featured several pro-business reforms amid the realisation that the controlled regime was not delivering the expected results. These policy changes included import liberalisation, export incentives, exchange rate policies, and expansionary fiscal policy. These reforms were argued to have a productivity-enhancing effect, as well as a demand-boosting effect facilitated by better credit availability and high levels of public expenditure7 . Simultaneously, they were enabled by unsustainable investments and questionable loans, opaque allocation of natural resources, and high fiscal deficits fuelling high inflation and external imbalances, resulting in the BOP crisis of 1990-91. The BOP crisis triggered a complete overhauling of economic policies to a market economy. Significant trade policy reforms along with revamping of industrial policies, including the withdrawal of industrial licensing and liberalisation of foreign direct investment (FDI), were introduced.



INVESTMENT  AND SAVINGS


Saving, Investment and National Income

Trends

Saving rate has steadily increased over time, from an extremely low base of 9.0 percent in 1950-51 to 37.7 percent in 2007-08 (Chart 1). A significant positive and robust relationship between growth rate and saving rate was observed during this period, as growth rate was also rising during this period. At the same time, investment rate has steadily increased, from a low base of 10.7 percent in 1950-51 to an all time high of 39.1 percent in 2007-08. Given that India had a closed capital account before 1991 which restricted capital mobility through administrative controls and outright prohibition, domestic saving and domestic investment in India were highly correlated (correlation coefficient is 0.99 percent for the entire period). It may be observed that the divergence between saving and investment is persistent until the liberalization and was narrowed down after the 1991 balance of payments crisis and further narrowed down after the economy shifted to a flexible exchange rate regime in 1993. The correlation between saving and investment in the post reform period is more or less unchanged from the pre-reform period (correlation in the prereform period is 0.9973 and in post reform period is 0.9972), however the gap between them has narrowed.

1

As is evident from Chart 1, economic growth was largely led by investment demand, which is captured by the gross domestic fixed capital formation in national accounts. Though growing foreign investment, both direct and portfolio investment play a role, the rise in investment was largely financed domestically. From a low of 21.6 per cent in 1991-92, India’s domestic saving rate jumped to a record high of 37.7 per cent in 2007-08. This fuelled investment, raising the demand for all types of investment related goods. This, in turn, had a multiplier effect on economic growth.

Composition

Domestic saving (Investment) of India is divided into two parts - Public Saving (Investment) and Private Saving (Investment). Private Saving (Investment) is further divided into two parts, those are Household Saving (Investment) and Corporate Saving (Investment).

While India’s saving and investment rates have steadily increased over time, their composition has undergone a considerable change (Chart 2). The most noticeable trend is the growing divergence between the public and private saving. Public saving declined from its peak level of 4.9 per cent of GDP in 1976-77 to – 2.2 per cent in 2001-02, from where it increased to 4.5 per cent in 2007-08. During the same period, saving rates of both the household and private corporate sectors have steadily increased, offsetting the decline in the public sector. The share of household saving in the total saving has increased from nearly 60 per cent in the early 1990s to a maximum of 94 per cent in 2001-02, after which it steadily declined to nearly 65 per cent in 2007-08. The private corporate sector, whose saving rate was stagnant till the late 1980s, has recently emerged as the sector with the fastest rising saving rate (1.8 per cent of GDP in 1987-88 to 8.8 per cent of GDP in 2007-08). The share of private corporate saving in total saving has increased from below 10 per cent in 1980s to more than 23 per cent in recent years.

2

Similar compositional changes have occurred in investment as well. Until late 1980s public investment rate was dominating and reached its peak of 12 per cent in 1986-87. Following the liberalisation in early 1990s, the role of public sector has gradually reduced in number of sectors, and its place has been taken over by the private sector. Hence, the private corporate investment has steadily increased offsetting the decline in the public sector investment. The share of public sector investment in total investment was stagnant at around 50 per cent till 1980s, and has declined to 23 per cent in 2007-08. On the other hand, the share of private corporate investment, which was little more than 20 per cent in 1980s, has steadily increased to 40 per cent in 2007-08. Household sector investment rate also increased from low base of 3.2 per cent in 1963-64 to 14.2 per cent in 2004-05 and it moderated thereafter. However, its share in total investment broadly remained the same.

3


To further elaborate the understanding using graphs

  • To understand the saving, investment led growth or growth driven saving and investment in India, we adopt Johansen methodology as given in figure. The study uses the annual data to examine the causal relationships between domestic saving, investment and income for India. Annual time series data for gross domestic product (GDP), gross domestic saving (GDS), gross domestic investment (GDI), saving and investment of household sector, private corporate sector and public sector for the period 1950-51 to 2007-08 are collected from the National Accounts Statistics, published by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. All data are in terms of domestic currency and nominal prices.










Monday, 12 September 2022

Naïve Bayes'.

 Naïve Bayes

Siddharth Jaiswal
21122316
Christ University, Lavasa.


Outline:-

 

  1. Conditional Probability for Naïve Bayes
  2.  Bayes Rule
  3. The Naïve Bayes
  4. Assumptions of Naïve Bayes
  5. Gaussian Naïve Bayes

 

We start with an interesting Machine learning Algorithm called the Naïve Bayes' Classifier Algorithm, It is essential to formulate Questions which is required to have an understanding about What this classifier algorithm is?, why do we use it?, how do we use it? and What is the objective and conclusion drawn?.

A group of classification algorithms built on the Bayes' Theorem are known as Naïve Bayes classifiers. It is a family of algorithms rather than a single method, and they all operate under the same guiding principle—that is, that each pair of features being classified stand alone. 


 

 Conditional Probability for Naïve Bayes

The possibility of an event or outcome happening contingent on the occurrence of a prior event or outcome is known as conditional probability. The probability of the prior event is multiplied by the current likelihood of the subsequent, or conditional, occurrence to determine the conditional probability. Let's use examples to help you comprehend this definition. If I were to ask you to choose a card from the deck, what are the chances of receiving a king if the card was a club? Pay close attention to how I specified that the card must be a club here. Due to the fact that there are 13 total cards in clubs, my denominator for calculating probability will be 13 rather than 52. We only have one king in clubs, so Given that the card is a club, the likelihood of getting a KING is 1/13 = 0.077. Let's look at one more illustration. Imagine conducting a coin toss experiment with two coins. Here, the sample space is: S = HH, HT, TH, TT

If someone were asked to calculate the likelihood of having a tail, their response would be 3/4 = 0.75.

Imagine that someone else conducts the exact same experiment under the same conditions, with the only difference being that both coins must be heads. This suggests that the elementary outcomes HT, TH, and TT could not have occurred if event A, "Both the coins should have heads," had occurred. Consequently, in this scenario, the likelihood of receiving heads on both coins will be 1/4 = 0.25.the aforementioned examples show us that if we are given extra knowledge, the probability may alter. In order to develop any machine learning model, we must first determine the output given a set of features.

 

  

 



 Bayes Rule:-

We are now prepared to state Bayes' Rule, one of the most important conclusions in conditional probability. Thomas Bayes, a British mathematician, proposed the Bayes' theorem in 1763, which offers a way to determine the likelihood of an event given sufficient information.

Bayes' theorem can be expressed mathematically as:

 





In essence, we are attempting to determine the likelihood of event A, assuming that event B is real.

When P(B) is used, it refers to the probability of an event occurring before the evidence, while P(B|A) is used to refer to the chance of an event occurring after the evidence has been observed. 

The formula for the probability of Y given a feature X is given to us by Bayes' rule. We hardly ever encounter a situation in real-world problems where there is just one feature.

When the features are independent, we can expand Bayes' rule to a method known as Naïve Bayes, which is based on the premise that the features are independent, i.e., changing the value of one feature does not affect the values of other variables.

Naïve Bayes can be applied to a wide range of tasks, including sentiment analysis, facial recognition, weather forecasting, medical diagnosis, and many others.

We make things simpler when there are numerous X variables by assuming that they are independent, so


 






 Assumptions of Naïve Bayes:-

They are all independent factors. That is, just because an animal is a dog, doesn't mean that it will be a medium size. Each predictor has a similar impact on the result. That is, whether or not we can pet the animal does not depend more on the fact that it is a dog. Each feature is equally important. We should attempt to use the Naïve Bayes method on the aforementioned dataset, but first we need to perform some precomputations on it.

 Gaussian Naïve Bayes:-

In our previous discussions, we have covered how to forecast probabilities when the predictors take on discrete values. But what if they go on forever? To achieve this, we must add a few more presumptions about the distribution of each feature. The assumptions that different Naïve Bayes classifiers make about the distribution of P(xi | y) are what differentiate them from one another. We'll talk about Gaussian Naïve Bayes here.

When we assume that every continuous variable connected to each feature is evenly dispersed, we utilize a method called Gaussian Naïve Bayes. Normal distribution is yet another name for the Gaussian distribution.

Here, the conditional probability is altered because the current values are different. A normal distribution's (PDF) probability density function is also represented by: 




 

The majority of applications for Naïve Bayes algorithms include sentiment analysis, facial recognition, weather forecasting, medical diagnosis, and news classification. We discovered the mathematical reasoning for this algorithm in this paper.

Monday, 2 May 2011

Should Euthanasia be legalized ?


Should Euthanasia be legalized ?

Euthanasia is the practice of killing one self to end the pain  and the suffering thus giving up hope resulting in depressed emotional outburst wherein the decision making is due to imbalanced depressed emotions, Its giving up on the human instinct to survive and it is absolutely not human. With such an understanding I absolutely disagree on Euthanasia being legalized

We should not legalize Euthanasia for reasons that it is demotivating and it sets bad example for the Society , It persuades and  develop suicidal tendencies in many people, and last but not the least It’s not basic human instinct for survival.

Euthanasia  is immoral and its practice should be condemned , it is a very demotivating example for the rest of the humans ,and obviously cannot make a society boom with good thinking and to adapt more relevant ways of healthy life to make human survival instinct as a dominent, instead will end up Demotivating and leaving people in dynamics of frustration and social biased perceptions.

Secondly It Persuades people and develops suicidal tendencies with an option to die when people can’t compete and struggle. Thus whoever is Depressed may end up taking advantage of Euthanasia and commit suicide. However this cannot stop people from committing suicide but it will give more people a reason to commit suicide, thus will validate and support that "SUICIDE" is the ultimate solution for every problem. This will make many humans incompetent of many things which includes solving the problem in every kind of situation.

Last but not the least euthanasia is against human nature, which is to survive in every possible condition . There are many examples of survivors of many diseases from worst condition, there have been survivors and they lived longer than many normal people, They could survive because they did not give up hope and followed their instinct of survival.

Therefore concluding Euthanasia is something which once comes to your mind you start thinking about it and later it takes grip of your thoughts and then you think you are suffering. The simple solution to this is not to be asked such a question.. Because once a Question is asked you start finding answers for it with your own favorable condition and try to validate it according to your status of suffering and condition . Thus you forget the real objective of life which is Live Life to its fullest age and live, all the rest aspect comes in between your living life. Thus I think Euthanasia doesn't stand a Chance to be legalized.